In a recent article in this journal I discussed Bernard Lonergan's understanding of systematic theology and suggested several ways of developing that understanding. In the present article I want to follow up on one of those suggestions, namely, the idea that 'a contemporary systematic theology in its entirety would be a theological theory of history.'
2 There is evidence to support this idea in some of Lonergan's papers. The development that I present here is my own, but it is based on my understanding of a number of Lonergan's texts, published and unpublished.
The present article has a broader scope, however. In the fall of 1959 Lonergan gave a course at the Gregorian University in Rome called 'De systemate et historia. ' The handwritten notes that he used for this course have yet to be adequately deciphered, let alone interpreted. 3 However, it is clear that the expression 'system and history' had a more complex meaning for Lonergan than is captured by saying that systematics should be a theology of history. It expresses a set of problems that are at the core of the 1 First published in Theological Studies 60:4 (1999) 652-78.
Robert M. Doran, 'Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology,'
Theological Studies 59:4 (1998) 569-607, at 596. (2009: This article is now the fifth of the Essays in Systematic Theology on this website. The quotation can be found on p.
43).
3 The notes, many of them in English, are available in the Lonergan Archives at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, and on the website www.bernardlonergan.com beginning at 47600D0E060. Some of Lonergan's notes for this course were typed, and these have been translated by Michael G. Shields and will appear in volume 23 of Lonergan's Collected Works.
2 methodological advance that he was struggling to achieve. In the present article I will assign four meanings to the expression 'system and history,' only one of which is that systematic theology is to be a theological theory of history. I do not claim that these meanings capture all of Lonergan's concern, and in fact I believe that they do not, that his concerns in the course on this matter were more far-ranging that my discussion here. 4 Here I am limiting myself to the four meanings that presently concern me, aware that I
have not covered all of his concerns regarding this issue. But I will try to spell out all four meanings, not simply that meaning that claims that systematics is a theory of history.
It is my view that theologians influenced by Lonergan are poised to move to a new plateau of operation governed by the reconciliation of the ideal of system with the reality of history, in fact that a few have already moved there. It is also my view that Lonergan makes this reconciliation possible. But the problem has at least the four dimensions that I wish to discuss here, and the claim that systematic theology is to be a theological theory of history is but one of these four meanings.
Synthesis as Development
Human understanding, however systematic, always occurs within a context or set of ongoing and mutually influencing contexts. All concepts have dates, and the acts of understanding that ground them are historically conditioned in multiple ways. From this 4 The Lonergan of the period from the publication of Insight in 1957 to the breakthrough to functional specialization in 1965 is one of the most complex figures in twentieth-century intellectual history. I believe that it will take Lonergan students quite some time before they really grasp what was going forward in his development during these years. recently begun to be cleared, namely, in the work of Lonergan. As yet no series of systematic theologies has been explicitly and deliberately built upon it, though of course every genuine achievement has relied on it in actu exercito. The nature of the ground is such that, in principle, such a series could extend indefinitely. We can envision today, perhaps for the first time in the history of Catholic theology, the possibility of a conscious and deliberate ongoing genetic sequence of systematic statements. We can envision a developing synthesis, one that in any of its stages probably is never complete in any one person's mind, one that resides rather in the collaborative community itself and that receives its unity from the community's ongoing struggle to be faithful to a common foundation. We can envision a synthesis that, building on radical and ongoing clarifications of Christian, moral, intellectual, and affective integrity, has the potential to extend over centuries, exhibiting perhaps something analogous to the ongoing history of the more successful empirical sciences. This anticipation of an ongoing genetic sequence of systematic theologies is the first meaning of the expression 'system and history.' Let me fill it out a bit more.
Lonergan writes, 'When the classicist notion of culture prevails, theology is conceived as a permanent achievement, and then one discourses on its nature. When culture is conceived empirically, theology is known to be an ongoing process, and then one writes on its method.' 8 When one writes on theology's method, one asks about the operations to be performed, the objectives to be pursued, and the procedures to be followed by a collaborative community that, at least in principle, will extend into an indefinite future. But to speak about 'system and history' in the context of Lonergan's work is also to indicate that the historical sequence of collaborative efforts in systematics These notes are among the most important sources for understanding Lonergan's development during these years.
8 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology xi. We can expand this first meaning of 'system and history' by reflecting on the impossibility of a definitive Summa. Some systematic achievements are in fact permanent contributions that can only be built upon, not gone back on. Some of these achievements were in fact arrived at in the medieval Summae. But higher viewpoints are always possible, for questions can arise that cannot be answered by drawing on the resources of any available system, even the best. When that happens, readjustments are demanded that call not just for an expansion of present system but for its sublation into a more inclusive point of view that has yet to be reached. 9 Higher viewpoints are 'higher' not because they are more inclusive but because they call for a shift in terms and relations within the discipline and consequently for a rearrangement even of some of the permanent achievements. Every systematic theologian writing today must acknowledge that his or her theology is part of an ongoing sequence of theologies. Any genuine and 9 On the difference between 'homogeneous expansion ' and 'higher viewpoint, ' see Lonergan, even permanent achievement that it may attain is always likely to assume a different position and status in a later theology that grasps more than we do or that comprehends more deeply what we may grasp less adequately.
The questions that are the sources of such higher viewpoints in systematic theology occur in two distinct areas. Sometimes they arise from cultural developments that are relatively independent of theology. At other times they lead directly to deepened insight into the mysteries of faith themselves, in their distinct supernatural reality. The latter advances, more often than not, are the contributions of those theologians who also fulfil one of theology's principal responsibilities. At best, as for example in the better moments in the theology of Karl Barth, it exercises a self-mediation from the events of revelation to the contemporary faith of the Church. But theology should do more. Its responsibility is to be the locus of a mutual self-mediation of the religious tradition and a given cultural matrix or, given today's global communications networks, a given set of cultural matrices. But it can fulfil its responsibility only when it assumes the proper attitude toward the 'general categories.' Much of the more fashionable theology in our day is avoiding precisely this challenge, because it knows itself to be unequal to meeting it.
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A major and crucial methodological problem lies precisely here: how to achieve or reach a theological synthesis that really does issue from a mutual self-mediation with culture, but that does so without falling into the conceptualist and reductionist trap of the method of correlation. The invariant ground that Lonergan provides, I submit, makes this possible. It enables a genetic sequence of such syntheses. It enables a theologian to expect such a sequence and to work to bring it about.
System as Witness
If the first meaning of 'system and history' anticipates a future history of systems, the second meaning has to do with recovering the past.
As I mentioned in the previous article to which reference has been made, Lonergan comments, in the first chapter of an early version of his systematics of the 11 There is a great danger in 'language-game' theories and 'cultural-linguistic' approaches to theology (which are probably best thought of as a kind of linguistic idealism) to reduce intellectual enterprises to a set of discrete and non-communicating strata of concepts. My position strongly disagrees with this tendency, which I regard as a disaster for all fields affected by it. University of Toronto Press, 1992) 600.
16 '… dialectic stands to generalized method as the differential equation to classical physics, or the operator equation to the more recent physics. For dialectic is a pure form with general implications; it is applicable to any concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles that are modified cumulatively by the unfolding; it can envisage at once the conscious and the nonconscious either in a single subject or in an aggregate and succession of subjects; it is adjustable to any course of events, from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, breakdown, and disintegration; it constitutes a principle of integration for specialized studies that concentrate on this or that aspect of human living, and it can integrate not only theoretical work but also factual reports;
finally, by its distinction between insight and bias, progress and decline, it contains in a general form the combination of the empirical and the critical attitudes essential to human science. Explanatory history may be correlated with a type of diachronic structuralism, 17 an explanatory grasp of the relations among stages, where the relations are both genetic and dialectical.
Again, the theology that emerges from such a new movement will not be systematic theology in the traditional sense of that term. It will be, in Lonergan's terms in Divinarum personarum, 'praeter theologiam systematicam' (in addition to or beyond systematic theology). It will be something new. But it will include systematic theologies. In the ideal order it would include all of them. But it will include them precisely as a systematic theology of the past history of the community, of doctrine, of theology, and in fact of the religions and religious thought of humankind. Its comprehension of history will not be simply narrative and descriptive. It will be in principle synthetic and explanatory, however piecemeal its explanatory grasp of relations may at any time be. Its synthesis will emerge as it traces genetic and dialectical relations among various moments in history. If there is to be a new systematic theology in the strict sense of that term, namely, an understanding of the realities intended in the community's constitutive meaning, it will include, however much in a subordinate position, a theology of theologies, just as Lonergan's Insight includes and grounds a philosophy of philosophies. This is the point to the second meaning of 'system and history.'
The emphasis that Lonergan is stressing in these admittedly very long reachings resembles the methodical and scientific hermeneutics of philosophical statements that he 14 not in the abstract but in the concrete, grasping form or intelligibility in the relations among the various details that historical research itself provides for this new, synthetic understanding.
History as Mediated Object of Systematic Theology
The third meaning of 'system and history' has to do with the further and ultimately more substantive dimensions of the objective of systematics. I touched briefly on this meaning in the article mentioned at the beginning, in the section 'Structure,' 20 and it is the problem with which I began the present article. It is to the effect that the mediated object of systematic theology is history itself, that systematic theology is to be a theological theory of history.
This third meaning is affirmed quite clearly in some papers that can be studied in the Lonergan archival collection. Lonergan wrote these papers at the time of his breakthrough, in February of 1965, to the notion of functional specialties. In these papers
Lonergan states that the 'mediated object' of systematics is history, Geschichte. 21 To limit the mediated object of systematics to the theology of theologies that I just spoke of in the previous section would be to submit to an idealism of a Hegelian variety. And so, if we are to be true to Lonergan's meaning and to systematics itself, a broader notion of history is required than simply the history of ideas. (1) the data are made available though research, and the availability of data is the goal appropriate to the empirical or presentational level of consciousness;
(2) the data are understood in interpretation, which corresponds to the intelligent level of consciousness; what for us is the present age becomes for our successors something to be studied in the first, mediating phase of a future theology.
The conception is brilliant. At least in principle it includes everything that goes on in theology, every operation that theologians perform. It offers a potential totality of 17 theological operations, and provides the framework for the coalescence of the operations into distinct but related specializations or, in Lonergan's phrase, functional specialties.
Mediating Objects, Mediated Objects, and the Mediating Subject
Now, on a handwritten piece of paper 23 that perhaps represents the earliest extant record of Lonergan's breakthrough to this notion of the structure of the entire discipline of theology, the four specialties of the 'hearing' phase of theology are called research, interpretation, history, and conversion. 'History' is further specified by the use of the German word Historie. And the four specialties of the 'saying' phase are called foundations, doctrine, explanation, and communication. 24 Furthermore, in a step that for some reason did not find its way into Method in Theology, there is specified a 'mediating object' for each of the specialties of the first phase and a 'mediated object' for each of the specialties of the second phase. The 'mediating objects' of the first phase are, respectively, the given, meaning, truth, and encounter. The 'mediated objects' of the second phase are, respectively, God, redemption, Geschichte, and world. And the 'mediating subject' is introduced at the end of the first phase as catalyst of the transition from hearing to saying. That is, in addition to mediating objects, there is required a
mediating subject: what grounds the self-mediation of the subject, the grounding later called 'foundational reality,' lies outside the domain of theology itself, but it is required if one is to move into the second phase, and its objectification is required if that move is to be methodical. That is, the mediating objects of the first phase are not sufficient of 
Lonergan on the Dialectic of History
Lonergan says about the basic structure of his notion of history. '… my first approximation was the assumption that men always do what is intelligent and reasonable, and its implication was an ever increasing progress. The second approximation was the radical inverse insight that men can be biased, and so unintelligent and unreasonable in their choices and decisions. The third approximation was the redemptive process resulting from God's gift of his grace to individuals and from the manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus.' 26 But it is in a later paper entitled 'Natural Right and Historical
Mindedness' that Lonergan presents perhaps his most refined view of the matter. Here he recasts his views in terms of meaning, and especially in terms of the meaning constitutive of human communities. History is rooted in a 'total and dialectical source of meaning.' The same progress-decline-redemption structure remains in effect, but these steps are now spoken of primarily in terms of the dialectic of the development of meaning. The analysis is complex, and I can do little more here than summarize its main features. 'that passionateness has a dimension of its own: it underpins and accompanies and reaches beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious.' I would note that both 'Mission and the Spirit' and 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness' were written after I had shared with Lonergan my views on psychic conversion, and that footnote 7 of 'Mission and the Spirit' refers, precisely in the context of explicating the passionateness of being, to two books that I gave Lonergan to read. This 'normative source of meaning,' however, is not the total source of meaning.
For the norms can be violated, not only by isolated individuals but also by the manifold of individual responsibilities that has coalesced into the functioning order of a society.
And so 'from the total source of meaning we may have to anticipate not only social order but also disorder, not only cultural vitality and achievement but also lassitude and deterioration, not an ongoing and uninterrupted sequence of developments but rather a dialectic of opposed tendencies.' 29 The 'total source of meaning in history' is dialectical, in the sense that I have called a dialectic of contradictories. There is a conflict immanent in a society's carriers and embodiments of meaning, whether that society be a local community or global humanity. Grace can now be conceived not only as enabling individuals to be capable of sustained authenticity, sustained fidelity to the transcendental precepts, but also as influencing the coalescence of these individual responsibilities in the making of community and the direction of history. (This is, in my view, the next major step to be taken in the doctrine and systematics of grace.)
Psychic Conversion and the Dialectic of History
To Lonergan's analysis I have added an analysis of the psychic dimensions of the same dialectic of history. That is, in addition to the operators of authentic development that lie in questions that enable people to be intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, there is also 29 'Natural Right and Historical Mindedness' 176. 23 an 'aesthetic and dramatic operator' that does several things, and in fact that coincides with Lonergan's 'tidal movement' or 'passionateness of being.' First, as underpinning intentional consciousness, it produces the images that are required for insight. Second, as accompanying intentional operations, it is the 'mass and momentum' of feeling that makes these operations a dramatic sequence of events. Third, as overarching these operations, it is the power of a love that meets us as we are, that brings rest to our intentional striving and psychic restlessness, and that releases in us the capacity for total commitment. Lonergan consistently emphasizes three authentic arenas of such total commitment: the intimacy that constitutes families, the loyalty that enjoins responsibility for the well-being of our fellow men and women, and the unrestricted being in love that is being in love with God.
When Lonergan places the normative source of meaning in history in a 'tidal movement' that begins before intentional consciousness, unfolds through the four levels of such consciousness, and finds its rest beyond these levels of intentional consciousness, he is in fact acknowledging that the intentional operators of intelligent, reasonable, and principle to restore an equilibrium.' 30 '… dialectic is a pure form with general implications; it is applicable to any concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles that are modified cumulatively by the unfolding; it can envisage at once the conscious and the nonconscious either in a single subject or in an aggregate and succession of subjects; it is adjustable to any course of events, from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, breakdown, and disintegration …' 
The Dialectics of the Subject, Community, and Culture
There are at least three instances of this kind of dialectic, where the basis of one pole is psychic and of the other spiritual or intentional. Lonergan speaks of the dialectic of the subject and the dialectic of community. To these I have added the dialectic of culture.
In the dialectic of the subject the respective poles are (1) the censorship exercised by our dramatically patterned intentional consciousness in our everyday lives, on the one hand, and (2) the neural demands that come into consciousness in the form of images and feelings or, more basically, affects. The censorship is necessary: we cannot deal with everything, nor do we have to. At the same time, the censorship is repressive when it blocks from consciousness precisely both the images that we need for insight and the feelings that accompany the images. The more this goes on, the more the constitution of This is my hypothesis.
The Analogy of Dialectic
What can be said about these three interrelated dialectical processes? What I write here Third, the integrity of each dialectic is a function, not of one or other of the internally constitutive principles but of some third principle of 'higher synthesis.' The integrity of the dialectic of the subject is a function, directly and proximately, of the gift of grace. The integrity of the dialectic of culture is a function of the soteriological constitutive meaning of the gospel. The integrity of the dialectic of community is a function of the integrity of culture itself.
Fourth, around each of these principles of higher synthesis there does function a dialectic of contradictories: either accepting or rejecting grace; either accepting or 28 rejecting the message of salvation; either accepting or rejecting culture as the source of social integrity.
The Scale of Values
Finally, I must say something about the interrelations of the three dialectical processes. There are relations within this scale both 'from above' and 'from below.' From above, the more complex levels are the condition of the possibility of successfully functioning schemes of recurrence at the more basic levels. From below, besides the obvious reverse conditioning, there is a law to the effect that questions emerging at more basic levels evoke operations that will lead to consolidations at higher, more complex levels.
First, then, the effective recurrence of schemes at the more basic levels is a function of the recurrence of schemes at higher levels. Thus (1) (infrastructural and superstructural) are a function of the integrity of persons in community, and that integrity is coincident with the integral dialectic of the subject. And (4) such personal integrity is a function of grace. Thus we have our first set of relations:
schemes at the higher levels of value condition schemes at the more basic levels, including the integral functioning of the dialectics of subjects, culture, and community.
But the problems that emerge on the more basic levels condition the emergence of the questions that, if pursued freely, will result in changes at the more complex levels so as to meet the problems emergent at the more basic levels. Moreover, the scale or proportion of the problems that exist at the more basic levels determines the extent of the changes that must take place at the higher levels. In other words, the proportions of the To insist that systematic theology is to be a theological theory of history is to urge that a contemporary systematic understanding of the dogmas and of theological doctrines best takes the form of understanding the meaning of such dogmas and doctrines in their relation to the complex structure of history itself. The principal general categories of such a systematic theology will be the categories that are employed to understand historical process itself in an explanatory fashion. This is the third meaning of the expression 'system and history.'
Theology as Praxis
Finally, the fourth meaning of 'system and history' is suggested by an expression that Lonergan employs in the same archival notes to describe the second phase: 'theology as 34 See ibid. chapter 2 passim. What is direct discourse in theology? Whether in doctrines or systematics or communications, direct discourse will be informed by and continuous with those achievements of the tradition that one judges genuine and that one wishes to carry forward. 'Foundations' as a distinct functional specialty names only part of the real foundations, for another major part emerges from work in research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. 37 Anyone engaging in direct theological discourse must be always engaged as well in a continual ressourcement. But direct discourse is more than just continuing the effective history of the classic texts of the tradition, however permanent one may judge the significance of some contributions to be, and however much direct discourse will always partly be a matter of transposing that significance into contemporary contexts. To limit direct discourse to such a continuation of the tradition's effective history is to limit its mediating function to a self-mediation of Christian constitutive meaning, a mediation from revelation and tradition to the contemporary faith of the Church. And that is only part of theology's mediating function. For contemporary contexts themselves are further theological sources. They give rise not only to questions that can at times be answered by transposing insights from the tradition, but also to the particular standpoint on the relation of cultural to social values that is overlooked in some liberation theologies. If theology not only leads to praxis but in some sense is praxis, it is first and foremost the praxis of constitutive meaning. Horizons can be related in complementary, genetic, or dialectical manners.
Sometimes mutual self-mediation is explicitly dialectical. That is, it is the reflection of mutual repudiation and negation. This can be for at least two reasons. First, the community of faith will always find itself in interchange with futile ways of life from which it must pray for its own liberation; and to the extent that it allows the prayer to be answered it can also always invite others to share in its freedom. Second, however, the Church itself in its concrete practice will always stand under the judgment both from within and from without of women and men of intellectual, moral, religious, and affective integrity. Elements in the culture itself can occasion a conversion on the part of the Church from biased and sinful elements in the horizon operative in ecclesial praxis.
However much authenticity is in the last analysis a function of divine grace, it stands above and beyond church affiliations.
But mutual self-mediation can also reveal both a complementarity in horizons and genetic relations that go both ways. So the Church will at times offer an advance on a line of development in a culture; and a culture will at times invite the community of faith to grow beyond immature, fearful, culturally relative, or undifferentiated stances. 
Summary and Conclusion
I have tried to indicate four meanings of the phrase 'system and history' and to spell out in a bit more detail the meaning of the claim that I made in an earlier article that systematic theology is to be a theology of history. The entire discussion clearly leads to a reconception of systematics, one that may appear almost overwhelming in its consequences and demands.
We cannot shrink before the large challenge confronting systematic theology, however difficult it may be to meet it. It is already past time -one might even say three and the significance of Christian faith in that situation is now long dead. Any intellectual integration analogous to that provided by the best of Scholasticism, but on the level of our times, must be largely heuristic and operational because grounded in a method that recognizes that theology is an ongoing development. 43 But the fact of fides quaerens intellectum has not been canceled in the process. Lonergan offers part at least of the heuristic and operational ground for a new, open intellectual integration, and the work of constructing a contemporary systematic theology in fundamental accord with the method that he has left us, and with the inspiration behind it, has to begin.
Central to that work will be the responsibility of maintaining a continuity with the methodological insistence of the best of Scholasticism, and especially of Aquinas, on the interrelation in theology of general and special categories, and especially of course on the interrelation of the realities named by each set of categories. Lonergan's insistence on both sets of categories, presented in his chapter on foundations, and alluded to subsequently as he speaks of work in theological direct discourse, is entirely in continuity with Aquinas. It is true, of course, that the ground of each set of categories is now able to be differentiated, whereas Aquinas left that ground for the most part implicit. And it is true as well that especially the general categories, but the special categories as well, will now include far more than Aquinas, in his own intellectual context, could envision. All of science was for Aquinas and for several centuries after him entirely in continuity with, and a development upon, basic philosophical and especially metaphysical categories.
Only in the early modern period did science become methodologically and materially 
